Solving adversarial patrolling games with bounded error: (extended abstract)
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2014 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'14) |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Informatics |
| Keywords | patrolling games; stochastic games; epsilon-optimal strategy |
| Description | Patrolling games are partially observable games played by two players, the defender and the attacker. The defender aims for detecting intrusions into vulnerable targets by following randomized routes among them, the attacker strives to maximize the probability of a successful (undetected) intrusion. We show how to translate patrolling games into turn-based perfect information stochastic games with safety objectives so that optimal strategies in the perfect information games can be transferred back to patrolling games. We design, to the best of our knowledge, the best algorithm which can compute an epsilon-optimal strategy for the defender among all (history-dependent) strategies. |
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