Does the Natural Law Theory Ground Inherent and Inalienable Rights?
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2024 |
| Druh | Další prezentace na konferencích |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | The post-war human rights discourse was deeply shaped by the natural law tradition under the aegis of personalism. One of its key proponents, Jacques Maritain, a famous philosopher of this era, tried to derive the concept of human rights from the classical Thomistic conception of natural law. John Finnis, the main representative of the new natural law theory, also embraced them since, in his opinion, the grammar of rights provides a way of expressing virtually all the requirements of practical reasonableness. In my paper, I will dispute their claims and show that it is necessary to analyse human rights as crucially dependent on the common good, which plays a more prominent role in the natural law tradition. I will argue that the idea of natural law cannot ground inalienable and inherent human rights, since they cannot be abstracted from the concrete historical relationships of human beings, who are united in their endeavour to achieve common goods. The criticism of Finnis´ conceptualisation of the common good will enable me to position human rights within the natural law conception. |
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