Vliv technologických nástrojů na ústavnost krizových opatření omezujících svobodu pohybu
| Title in English | Impact Of Technological Tools On Constitutionality of Emergency Measures Restricting Freedom of Movement |
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| Year of publication | 2022 |
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| Description | The first objective of this research report was to map trends in the use of technology tools to address the SARS-CoV-2 crisis within the G20 permanent members from 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2021. Aware of the limitations of this approach, we then also conducted an additional search without geographical restrictions for the period 1 July 2021 to 31 August 2022. The technology tools used were grouped based on the purposes for which they were used. The second objective of this research report was to develop guidelines for each group of technology tools to facilitate the assessment of the proportionality of their deployment. The proportionality test can only be carried out in the specific context of deploying a given technology for a particular purpose. However, our guidelines will enable the proportionality assessment to be structured considering the crisis phase. The central insight from the overview analysis is the possibility of dividing the technological tools into five basic types (two of them with different variations) pursuing specific objectives in the form of: 1. Contact tracing with variations using (i) Bluetooth protocol, (ii) motion recording using GNSS, (iii) motion recording using traffic and location data, and (iv) other collection and subsequent transmission of information to public authorities; 2. Status certificates; 3. Contactless services; 4. Public information and education; 5. Surveillance and enforcement of restrictive measures, with variations using (i) non-anonymised traffic and location data, (ii) anonymised traffic and location data, (iii) mobile applications, (iv) other means of surveillance (e.g. wristbands), (v) unmanned aerial vehicles, and (vi) camera systems. Within these types, we identified technologies unsuitable for deployment due to their interference with core privacy and data protection rights (e.g., tracking using traffic and location data and use of automatic facial recognition by cameras mounted on unmanned vehicles). |
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